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The court of Exchequer comes of age
W. HAMIL TON BRYSON

The Exchequer was well established as a court of law in the thirteenth
1
century. For the next three hundred years, the Exchequer court seems to
have carried out its duties without much change in function or status.2 At
the beginning of the sixteenth century, the judicial business of the Exchequer amounted to about 200 cases per year as compared with about
2500 in the court of King's Bench and 10,000 in the Common Pleas.3
However, during the middle period of the reign of Henry VIII, the first
signs of growth since the thirteenth century appeared. This expansion of
the court of Exchequer continued steadily through the reigns of the later
Tudors to the beginning of the Interregnum. In 1649 the Exchequer court
established itself as a high court of general jurisdiction in both common
law and equity. At this point the Exchequer can be said to have come of
age as a court oflaw. This development began during the reign of Henry
VIII and can be seen as part of the Tudor Revolution in government.

I
The expansion of the judicial jurisdiction of the Exchequer paralleled the
increase in its political and financial importance. Perhaps the court could
1

2

3

See Charles H. Jenkinson and Beryl E. R. Formoy (eds.), Select Cases in the Exchequer of
Pleas, Selden Society, XLVIII (London. 1932); John H. Baker, Introduction to English Legal
History, 2nd edn (London, Butterworths, 1979), 44-6; S. F. C. Milsom, Historical Founda-.
tions of the Common Law (Londop, Butterworths, 1969), 20--1, 53-4; Charles Gross, 'The
jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer under Edward !,' Law Quarterly Review, xxv
(1909), 138-44.

There are no detailed studies of the court of Exchequer during the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries; so these generalizations should be accepted with caution, until the end of the era.
Then see, DeL!oydJ. Guth, 'Exchequer penal law enforcement 1485-1509' (University of
Pittsburgh, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1967) which gives detailed analyses of mesne process- and quantified litigation. There is no published book on the Exchequer similar to
Margaret Hastings, The Court of Common Pleas in Fifteenth-Century England (Ithaca, N. Y.,
Cornell University Press, 1947), and Marjorie Blatcher, Court of King's Bench 1450-1550:
A Study in Self Help (London, Athlone Press, 1978).
DeL!oydJ. Guth, 'Notes on the early Tudor exchequer of pleas,' in Arthur]. Slavin (ed.),
Tudor Men and Institutions (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1972), 106.
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not have increased the scope of its jurisdiction without the approval and
support of the most powerful politicians of the kingdom. Even if their
good wishes were not necessary, their self-interest would not have
hindered the growth of the court.
The lord treasurer was the head of the Exchequer. Although he never
sat on the common law side of the court, he did sit on the revenue and
equity sides. During·the middle ages the office of lord chancellor_ seems to
have been more important politically than that of lord treasurer, and the
chief advisors to the king, such as Cardinal Wolsey, preferred to be
appointed to the former office. From 1547 to 1612, however, the men
who held the office of treasurer - Edward Seymour, William Paulet,
Willian1 Cecil, Thomas Sackville, and Robert Cecil - were far more
prominent politically than the chancellors of the time. With powerful
politicians as head of the Exchequer department, times were favorable for
the expansion of the Exchequer court. 4
The fact that Thomas Cromwell, the chief advisor to Henry VIII from
1533 to 1540, was not lord treasurer is noteworthy. The treasurer during
this time was Thomas Howard, third duke of Norfolk, who had been
given the office in 1522; his military skills made him indispensable to the
king, and he was not removed in favor of Cromwell. Cromwell received
instead the office of chancellor of the Exchequer, and he significantly
increased its prestige and power. 5 The office of chancellor of the Exchequer became the second office in importance in the Exchequer during the
sixteenth century, overshadowing the lucrative offices of the cha1nberlains of the Exchequer. This was significant in the expansion of the
Exchequer court because the chancellor o( the Exchequer sat with the
barons of the Exchequer to hear suits brought on the equity side of the
court. The earliest equity bill of complaint presently known to have been
filed in the Exchequer is that in the case of Capull v. Ardern (1543-5). 6 This
suit commenced shortly after the fall of Thomas Cro1nwell.
Several months after the accession of Elizabeth 1, Sir Walter Mildmay
was appointed chancellor of the Exchequer. He was an active politician in
the middle rank of Tudor government. During his thirty-year tenure as
chancellor of the Exchequer, the equity side of the Exchequer picked up a
large amount of judicial business, and its office procedures <J_nd archives
were established. 7 Between the appointment of Cromwell to this office
4 W. 1-lamilton Bryson, Equity Side of the Exchequer (Can1bridge, CUP, 1975), 34-41, 171.
5 G. R. Elton, The Tudor Revolution in Government (Cambridge, CUP, 1953), 114-19, 266. '

6 PRO,E111/14.
7 Stanford E. Lehmberg, Sir Walter Mildma_y and Tudor Government (Austin, University of
Texas Press, 1964); Bryson, Eqrtity Side oftfte Exchequer, 20-1, 41-6, 106--7, 173.
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and the death of Mildmay, the equity jurisdiction of the court was initiated and firmly established.
The office of b-aron of the Exchequer was ancient. This is indicated by
the use of that general word 'baron,' i.e. man, to describe the office. A
baron of the Exchequer in the distant medieval past was an officer who did
all tasks including the judging of disputes involving revenues. In the
middle ages his judicial functions were not his most important duties.
However, in the Tudor period, the barons of the Exchequer as judges
became more significant. Before 1579 only the chief barons were
appointed from the ranks of the serjeants; the puisne barons were usually
barristers, but often they were men of only modest legal professionalism.
After 1579 all of the barons were appointed from the lawyers of the rank
of serjeant. As of this date the barons of the Exchequer were of equal
education and social rank with the justices of the other high courts at
Westminster, and this was very important for the prestige of the court of
Exchequer. 8 When the barons were members of Serjeants Inn and served
as justices of assize, the self-:congratulating snobbery of the other high
courts lost its force, and some very eminent jurists have sat in the Exchequer - men such as Hale, Gilbert, Parke, Alderson, and Pollock. The
professional equality of the Exchequer bench by the end of the reign of
Elizabeth I made it easier and perhaps more appropriate for the Exchequer
court to expand its jurisdiction. Chief Baron Sir John Walter, who sat
from 1625 to 1630, was a notable champion of the jurisdiction of his
court.
The financial functions of the Exchequer were diminished in the first
half of the sixteenth century by the use of the king's privy chamber and
various other departments to handle much of the royal revenue. By 1550,
however, the chamber as a treasury had ended. 9 In 1554 the financial
functions of the court of Aug1nentations and the court of First Fruits and
Tenths were given to the Exchequer, and these two institutions were
suppressed.10 This increased financial activity in the Exchequer in the
second half of the sixteenth century drew attention and litigation to it.
It is submitted that the partial eclipse of the Exchequer in the first half
of the sixteenth century was owing to its control by the second and third
dukes of Norfolk, who were successively lords treasurer from 1501 to
8

Bryson, Equity Side of the Exchequer, 48-51.
9 Elton, Tudor Revolution in Government, 169-77; Walter C. Richardson, History ofthe Court
ofAugmentations, 1536--1554 {Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1961), 22-9;
Walter C. Richardson, Tudor Chamber Administration, 1485-1547 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana
State University Press, 1952). But now see Dale E. Hoak's essay, above, 87ff., esp.
106-7.
10 Elton, Tudor Revolution in Government, 230-43; Richardson, Court ofAugmentations, 436ff.
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1546. They were too useful to be removed from their offices, but they
were too independent to be entrusted with any more power than was
necessary. Thus, while they held the office of treasurer, their power,
inco1ne, and patronage were kept in check by diminishing the activities
and responsibilities of the Exchequer. In 1546 the third duke of Norfolk
was arrested and stripped of his offices. Shortly thereafter the Exchequer
under William Paulet began to be revived as the major financial institution of the kingdom. (Only the court of Wards and Liveries remained to
handle any significant part of the revenues of the Crown.) From 1547 to
the end of the Tudor period, the lord treasurer was one of the major
ministers, if not the prime advisor, of the monarch. To say that the institution was the tool of its head would be an overstatement, but the
political position of its head, the treasurer, directly affected its role in the
national government.

II
The foundation of the judicial jurisdiction of the Exchequer was the settling of disputes between the Crown and a subject as to whether or how
much money was due to the Crown. Informal negotiation.~ quickly
developed in the thirteenth century into formal legal proceedings. The
Exchequer became what we might call a 'tax court'; the king was the
plaintiff and the subject, the 'tax-payer,' was the defendant. (The word
tax here includes not merely the medieval taxes due but also all other
forms and types of inco1ne due to the king, private sources of income as
well as public ones.) This was the theoretical foundation of the court's
legal jurisdiction in the sixteenth century as in earlier times, and the sixteenth century lawyers never lost sight of it.
The duty of the Exchequer to collect the royal revenue naturally led to
the determination of who owed the money. The next logical step was to
assist the person who owed the money to collect it from his own debtor;
otherwise he would be unable to pay his debt to the Crown or at least he
would be less able to pay, a position that was logically unassailable. This
second step, inaugurated in the thirteenth century, involved a separate
lawsuit between the two private parties in order to assure that there was in
fact a legal obligation on the part of the king's debtor's debtor. This
separate lawsuit could be brought in the court of Exchequer by means of
an allegation of quo 1ninus, asserting that the plaintiff was 'less able' to pay
the Crown because the defendant would not pay him. Thus a private
party could sue another private party in the Exchequer, if the plaintiff was
a debtor to the Crown and if that debt diminished his ability to settle with
152
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the Crown. If money was withheld, then logically the plaintiff was less
able to pay, and this second requirement for Exchequer jurisdiction was
legally unassailable."
The plaintiff, in the thirteenth century and throughout the Tudor
period, had to be a genuine debtor to the Crown to be able to sue in the
Exchequer court. However, most people of any financial standing would
have such obligations from time to time. The collection of the royal
revenue was not very rigorously pursued, and many people owed the king
some feudal due, rent, tax, duty, tillage, tenth, fifteenth, fine, amercement, scutage, fee, toll, hearth money, ship money, or the like. Any of
these classes of debtors could have sued before the Exchequer, in contract
or in tort, any other private person.
By the end of the thirteenth century, so many lawsuits between private
parties, placita communiae, had been brought into the Exchequer court by
writs of quo minus that a new office had to be set up to handle them. This
was the office of pleas, under the supervision of the clerk of the plea~.
That clerk and the sworn clerks under him handled the clerical aspects of
the common law litigation between private parties; the barons sat as the
judges, as they did in litigation directly involving the Crown.
To aid the king's debtors to recover from their debtors was a reasonably
implied power of the Exchequer, and this extension of its jurisdiction was
not questioned. Another equally valid extension of jurisdiction was to
allow its officers to sue and be sued only in the Exchequer; otherwise the
king's officers could be taken away from the performance of their duties,
and the Exchequer would function less effectively. This privilege was in
keeping with the practices of the other common law courts. The course of
the common law was, or could easily be made to be, circuitous and dilatory. Some forms of action were begun with the arrest and imprisonment
of the defendant by means of a writ of capias ad respondendum. An Exchequer officer could not properly serve the king in the Exchequer if he were
busy litigating in another court. The privilege to sue and be sued only in
the Exchequer, whether the litigation involved the Crown or not, was
given not only to the high officials but to the minor employees as well, to
anyone who was de gremio scaccarii. 12 This right was also extended to the
personal servants of the Exchequer officers.13
11 Jenkinson and Formoy, Select Cases in the Exchequer of Pleas, xxviii, xc-xci, c-cii; Harold
Wurzel, 'Origin and development of quo minus,' Yale Law Journal, XLlX (1939), 39-64.
12 Jenkinson and Formoy, Select Cases in the Exchequer ofPleas, xci-xcii, xcviii-xcix; Stradling
v. Morgan, 1Plowden199, 208, 75 English Reports 305, 318 (Exchequer 1560); Clapham v.
Lenthall, Hardres 365, 145 English Reports 499 (Exchequer 1664); that is, The English
Reports (176 vols., London, Stevens & Sons, Ltd, 1900-30).
13 E.g., Abbot v. Sutton, Year Book, Michaelmas 22 Henry VI, pl. 36, fol. 19 (Common
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A third area of Exchequer jurisdiction was the privilege granted to
public officials who were not officers of the Exchequer but who were
collectors of the royal revenue or a part of it. One of the major duties of
the sheriffs was to collect moneys due to the king and to account for thenl
in the Exchequer; many other royal officers had similar responsibilities. In
addition, many types of royal income were farmed out to private persons
for collection. Sheriffs and farmers of revenues were not officers of the
Exchequer, yet they were required to come into the Exchequer to make
their accounts. Lest they be hindered in this process of paying money to
the king, they were given the privilege at their option to sue and be sued
only in the Exchequer. This similarly prevented these local officers and
other accountants to the Crown from being tied up in the other courts.14
After their accounts were ~ettled but before the amounts found due were
paid, these persons had the slightly less advantageous position of debtors
to the Crown. ts It is to be noted that common law suits involving
accountants to the Crown, like those concerned with debtors to the
Crown; were common pleas; the king was not a party to the _suit, though
he was indirectly concerned in the outcome.

III
Thus we see that the Exchequer court was hearing lawsuits from the
thirteenth century onward. The barons sat as the judges in all cases, but
different clerks handled the paperwork of the different branches of the
court's jurisdiction. Where the litigation concerned the Crown directly, it
was a part of the revenue jurisdiction of the court and would be handled
by the king's remembrancer's office or the lord treasurer's remembrancer's office, depending on the nature or source of the revenue involved.
The office of pleas dealt with litigation between private persons, who had
the privilege to sue for common law claims in the Exchequer as debtors or
accountants to the Crown~ Here plaintiffs filed their writs of quo minus;
here was handled the conimon law side of the court. In the middle of the
sixteenth century, the equity side of the court arose within the king's
-remembrancer's office. As on other sides of the court, a suit in equity had
Pleas 1443), dictum; Leventhorp's Case, Year Book, Michaeln1as 34 Henry VI, pl. 28, fol.
15 (Con1mon Pleas 1455).
14 Jenkinson and Formoy, Select Cases in the Exchequer ofPleas, xciii-xciv, cii-cviii; Forde v.
N.B., Year Book, Michaelmas 9 Edward IV, pl. 20, fol. 40 (Common Pleas 1469), dictum,·
Young v. Clerk of the Hanaper, ·Year Book, Hilary 9 Edward IV, pl. 18, fol. 53; Case 67,
Jenkins 131, 145 English Reports 92 (Exchequer Chamber 1470); Anon., 2 Bulstrode 36,
80 English Reports 939 (l{ing's Bench 1612).
15 Clapham v. Lenthall, Hardres 365, 145 English Reports 499, 500 (Exchequer 1664).
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to concern the Crown or have been brought by someone privileged to
sue in the Exchequer .16
In the thirteenth century the details of the procedure are unclear. By the
beginning of the seventeenth century, however, the quantity of litigation
required the development of specific formulae by which royal rights
could be vindicated in the Exchequer. On the revenue side, if the action
was an official suit to collect money, the attorney-general sued ln the
king's name (viz. Rex v. Richard Roe). If a private party was suing for the
breach of a statute which gave him a share of the penalty and the Crown
the other part, then he would sue in his own name qui tam, 'who as well
as, the king was entitled to the penalty (viz. John Doe qui tam v. Richard
Roe). On the equity side, if the suit directly touched the Crown, the
attorney-general sued in his own name and office (viz. Attorney-General
v. ~ichard Roe). If the suit in equity only concerned the king indirectly,
the Private person, who was the real party in interest, sued by a relator
information (viz. Attorney-General ex relatione John Doe v. Richard Roe).
In actions at law and suits in equity by mere debtors to the Crown, the
king was not mentioned (viz. John Doe v. Richard Roe).
This brings us to the consideration of Exchequer privileges of suit in
relation to the other high courts at Westminster. The courts of Chancery,
King's Bench, and Common Pleas stood on an equal footing with the
Exchequer regarding removal of suits out of one court and into another.
The ·Writ of prohibition, which lay to inferior courts, did not travel be.,..
tween them. The removal of suits was based on the various privileges of
the courts which in turn related to their jurisdictions. Privileges were of
two sorts: special and general. The officers of the Exchequer and accountants had the benefits of the special privilege of the Exchequer, but mere
debtors to the Crown had only a general privilege.
General privileges gave a plaintiff only the right to sue in a certain
court. A general, as opposed to a special,. privilege could not be used by a
defendant as the grounds for removing a case· into another court.17
Moreover, if a plaintiff h<1d a general privilege and the defendant had a
special privilege in another court, the general privilege deferred to the
special, and the defendant could insist on being sued in his own court. 18
When both parties had special privileges but of different courts, then the
16

17

18

Bryson, Equity Side of the Exchequer, 13-27.
Hunt's Case, 3 Dyer 328, 73 English Reports 742 (Common Pleas 1573), semb/e: a supersedeas declaring the defendant to be a debtor to the Crown was not allowed.
E.g., Clapham v. Lenthali, Hardres 365, 145 English Reports 499 (Exchequer 1664); Castle
v. Lichfield, I-lardres 505, 145 English Reports 570{Exchequer1669); Note, 3 Salk. 281, 91
English Reports 825.
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court in which priority of suit was established heard the case.19 The courts
were not anxious to lose business in this way, and so they insisted on the
general rule that such a jurisdictional point be raised before a general
appearance or pleading to issue.20 Moreover, where there was a plurality
of defendants, all of them would have to be privileged in order for the
request for removal to have prevailed.21
The traditional method of removing suits into the Exchequer was by a
writ of supersedeas.22 However, a supersedeas could not be sent to the l<ing's
Bench because the pleas there were held coram rege and writs could not lie
against the king. 23 The problem was resolved by having the cursitor baron
take the Red l:look of the Exchequer into the King's Bench and assert that
the defendant was an officer or accountant in the Exchequer and could be
sued only there. 24 The cursitor baron showed the copy of the writ of
privilege which was in the Red Book, an official record, at folio 36.25
Thereupon the case was dismissed to the Exchequer without any plea or
prayer from the defendant.26
There were alternative methods of asserting the Ex.chequer privilege in
the seventeenth century. It could be pleaded by the defendant,27 or the
19 E.g., Bakerv. Let'lthall, Hardres 117, 145 English Reports 409(Exchequer1658); Clapham
v. Lenthall, Hardres 365, 145 English Reports 499(Exchequer1664); Note, 2 Salk. 281, 91
English Reports 825.
20 E.g., Note, Year Book, Michaelmas 22 Henry VI, pl. 9, fol. 7 (Common Pleas 1443);
Young v. Clerk of the Hanaper, Year Book, Hilary 9 Edward IV, pl. 18, fol. 53; Case 67,
Jenk. 131, 145 English Reports 92 (Exchequer Chamber 1470}; Case 31, Dal. 36; 123
English Reports 253 (Co1n1non Pleas 1561);Jervas's Case, Sav. 33, 123English Reports
996 (Exchequer 1582).
21 E.g., S. v. T.B., Year Book, Michaelmas 34 Henry VI, pl. 13, fol.. 29 (Common Pleas
1455); East v. Bitienson, Cary. 67, 21 English Reports 36; Cecil Monro (ed.}, Acta Cancellariae, or, Selectio11sfrom the Records of the Court of Chancery, 1558-1624 (London, W.
Benning and Co., 1847), 457, (Chancery, 1578); Powle's Case, 3 Dyer 377, 73 English
Reports 846, Godb. 10, 78 English Reports 6 (Common Pleas 1581); Vendall v. Harvey,
Nels. 19 at 22, 21 English Reports 779 (Chancery 1633); David E. C. Yale (ed.), Lord
Nottingham's Two Treatises: 'Manual of Chancery Practice' and 'Prolegomena of Chancery and
Equity' (Cambridge, CUP, 1965), 336.
22 E.g., Anon., Year Book, Michaelmas 21 Henry VI, pl. 44, fol. 22 (Con1mon Pleas, 1442).
2 3 Bracton, fol. Sb: George E. Woodbine (ed.), Bracton De Legibus el Co11suetudi11ibus Angliae
(4 vols., New Haven, Yale University Press, 1915-42), u, 33; trans. by Samuel E. Thorne
(ed.), Bracton On the Laws and Customs of England (4 vols., Cambridge, Mass.; The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968-77), n.
24 E.g., Walrend v. Winrol/, Noy 40, 74 English Reports 1010 (King's Bench 1601); Guy v.
Reyne!, 2 Brown!. and Golds. 266, 123 English Reports 934 (Common Pleas 1609), dictum;
Anon., 2 Bulstrode 36, 80 English Reports 939 (King's Bench 1612); Fosterv. Barrington, 2
Sid. 164, 82 English Reports 1313,. Hardres 164, 145 English Reports 433 (King's Bench
1659), dictum; Lampen v. Deering, 2 Show. K.B. 299, 89 English Reports 951 (King's
Bench 1680}.
2 5 PRO, E 164/2; this has been transcribed by Hubert Hall, The Red Book of the Exchequer,
Rolls Series, xcrx (3 vols., London, HMSO by Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1896), 111, 823-4.
26 Anon., 2 Bulstrode 36, 80 English Reports 939 (King's Bench 1612}.
27 E.g., Foster v. Barring/on, 2 Sid. 164, 82 English Reports 1313, Hardres 164, 145 English
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Red Book could have been sent into the court of Common Pleas. 28
However, in the eighteenth century it became customary to assert the
Exchequer privilege by means of an injunction out of the Exchequer to
the plaintiff; this was a personal order not to sue in the other court, but
with liberty to sue in the Exchequer.29 This was a far superior procedure
to the clumsy and embarrassing traditional methods Of supersedeas and
direct claim of jurisdiction in fade curiae.

IV
In the sixteenth century, the court of King's Bench, which like the Exchequer· had considerably less business than the court of Common Pleas,
consciously expanded its jurisdiction and its case load. This was done by
use; of the fiction in bills of Middlesex and writs of latitat and by the
ext~nsion of the scope of actions on the case.30 However, during the sixteenth century the court of Exchequer remained within its ancient, traditional boundaries.
The medieval Exchequer in its role as a court of law was explicitly
circumscrihed by statute. The Statute of Rhuddlan of 1284, the Articuli
super Cartas of 1300, and the Statute of 1311 had limited the court to cases
concerning the Crown and the officers of the Exchequer. 31 Thus the hearing of common pleas was generally forbidden to the Exchequer, but the
affairs of debtors to the Crown concerned the Crown sufficiently to
justify extending Exchequer jurisdiction to them. In the sixteenth century
litigants attempted to expand the jurisdiction of the Exchequer court by
means of fictions in pleading,32 but the court did not allow this.33
From the beginning of the Interregnum, however, the allegation of the
Exchequer general privilege, claiming that the plaintiff was a Crown
debtor, came to be used fictitiously on the equity side of the court. UnforReports 433 (King's Bench 1659); Wentworth v. Squibb, 1 Lutw. 43, 125 English Reports 23
(Common Pleas 1701); Phips v. Jackson, 6 Mod. 305, 87 English Reports 1045.(King's
Bench 1705).
28 E.g., Wentworth v. Squibb, 1 Lutw. 43, 125 English Reports 23 (Common Pleas 1701);
also, Lawrence Squibb, 'A Book of All the Several Officers of the Court of Exchequer
... , 'ed. by William Hamilton Bryson, Camden Miscellany XXVI, Camden Society, 4th
series, XIV (London, Royal Historical Society, 1975), 102-3, 112.
29 Cawthorne v. Campbell, 1 Anstr. 205, 145 English Reports 846(Exchequer1790);]. Manning, The Practice of the Court ofExcheqtter, Revenue Branch, 2nd edn (London, 1827), 191.
30 Baker, English Legal History, 38-41; Milsom, Historical Foundations, 54-7.
31 Parliamentary Statutes 12 Edward I [1284J; 28 Edward I [1300], c. 4; 5Edward11 [1311 ], c.
25, SR, I, 70, 138, 163.
32 JohnH. Baker (ed.), The Reports ofSir John Spelman, Selden Society, xcrv (London, 1978),
63, fn. 5.
33 Ragland v. Wildgoose, Savile 11, 15, 123 English Reports 984, 986 (Exchequer 1580);
Williams v. Griffin, PRO E 126/2, fol. 176v, (1619).
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tunately the first cases which allowed this fiction do not appear to have
been reported. The fictive jurisdiction was asserted at the beginning of
each bill by adding after the plaintiffs name the following phrase: ' ...
debtor and accountant to his majesty as by the .records of this honorable court and
otherwise it doth and may appear. '34 An examination of the files of the bills of
complaint discloses that this formula ofjurisdiction, which had been used
occasionally during the latter years of Charles I's reign, became general
after 1649 when most equity bills identify the plaintiff as a Crown
debtor,35 using this strict formula. Moreover, in many bills the formula
appears as an interlinear addition. The evidence of the records thu~ points
with some precision to the year 1649 for the introduction of the wider
jurisdiction based on this fictitious and non-traversable allegation of indebtedness to the Crown.36 The first referellces to the fictitious_ basis of
the Exchequer equity jurisdiction appear in Matthew Hale's treatise of
August 1665, 'Considerations Touching the Amendment or Alteration of
the Lawes, '37 and The Compleat Sollicitor (1666), page 389.
At the beginning of the Tudor period, therefore, the judicial jµrisdiction of the court of Exchequer was li1nited to common law matters that
affected the revenue of the Crown. By the end of the Tudor period the
court had acquired an equity jurisdiction, and therefore was the .only high
court of justice in England to administer both general civil Common law
and equitable remedies. In 1649 the Exchequer extended its common law
and equitable jurisdictions to all parties; at this point the court of Exchequer came of age as a full-fledged high court of general jurisdiction. Thus,
although the courts of Common Pleas, Chancery, and King's Bench had
developed earlier, -the couft of Exchequer ultimately embraced a lesser
quantity but a greater scope of judicial action.
34 David B. Fowler, The Practice of the Court of Exchequer upon Proceedings in Equity (2 vols.,
London, 1795), r, 29; Anon., The Compleat Sollidtor (1666}, 389; William Bohun, The
Practising Attorney; or, Lawyer's Office (London, 1724), 292; Anon., The Comp/eat Clerk in
Court (1726), 149; Samuel Turner, An Epitome ofthe Practice on the Equity Side ofthe Court of
Exchequer (London, 1806), 2.
35 Or a debtor to the Commonwealth.
36 This fits with the tentative conclusions in regard tO the Exchequer common law fiction in
Wurzel, 'The origin and development of quo minus,' 39, 61, 64. Furthermore no reported
cases have been found after 1649 which challenge the general jurisdiction of the court. It is
submitted that the Exchequer extended all of its jurisdictions to all litigants at the same
time, 1649.
37 In Francis Hargrave {ed.), A Collection of Tracts Relative to the Law ofEngland (Dublin, for
E. Lynch, etc., 1787), 278; the date is given in BL, MS Harleian 711, fol 187v.

158

